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Mainstream addiction science is now widely, though not uniformly, marked by an anti-
nomy between a neurologically determinist understanding of the brain ‘hijacked’ by the
biochemical allure of intoxicants and what I am calling a liberal voluntarist conception
of drug use as a free exercise of choice (see Heather and Segal, 2017; Heyman, 2009;
Lewis, 2018; Volkow, Koob, and McLellan, 2016). Prominent defenders of both dis-
courses strive, ultimately without complete success, to provide accounts of freedom and
addiction that are both universal and value-neutral. This has resulted in a variety of
conceptual problems and has undermined the utility of such research for those who seek
to care for people presumed to suffer from addictions. In this article, I argue contem-
porary debate would benefit substantially from a review of the discursive contexts within
which the concept of addiction originally gained a degree of intellectual legitimacy and
broader cultural traction. These are the Puritan and civic republican discourses that
dominated scholarly discussions of addiction in the early modern era. By comparing
them to their early historical antecedents, I seek to reflexively explore and develop more
intellectually sound and therapeutically relevant alternatives to the troubled attempts at
universality and value-neutrality that now fetter debates in mainstream addiction
science.
After reviewing prominent positions in the ‘brain disease’ and liberal voluntarist
discourses, I then proceed to discuss prominent positions in the early modern Puritan
and civic republican discourses on addiction. In each case, the place of values in these
positions is highlighted. I conclude with a statement of some of the more important
ramifications that follow from a more historically informed and, thereby, analytically
incisive understanding of the real-world vicissitudes of freedom and addiction as they
take form ‘in the wild’, to borrow Edwin Hutchins’ (1995) evocative phrase—outside
laboratories, and in the more therapeutically relevant contexts of people’s everyday lived
experiences. These ramifications include a proposed return from the present preoccupa-
tion with the dichotomy between freedom and neurological determinism to that which
preoccupied early modern theorists between freedom and slavery. They also include a
proposal for updating the appreciation, now lost to addiction science, that early modern
theorists had for the intersection between judgements of freedom and slavery, on the one
hand, and judgements of virtue and vice, on the other. As will be shown, this updating
can be achieved by supplementing contemporary liberal theory’s now preponderant
tendency to equate freedom with the autonomous pursuit of hedonic values (concerning
desires) with the pursuit of what Aristotle called eudaimonic values (concerning well-
being).
A note on theory and methodology
This article has been written with the intention to contribute to current debates in
addiction science by recourse to early modern history. With respect, then, to the brain
disease discourse and the liberal voluntarist discourse, I take constructively critical
positions. These positions are predicated on my sharing a value commitment widely,
but not uniformly, exhibited in these discourses to make addiction science more relevant
to the work of both caring for addicts and providing broader political and cultural
warrant for therapeutic care over punishment. Defenders of the brain disease paradigm
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have consistently emphasized the importance of defending a medical frame for drug
problems not only because they believe the best neurological research suggests the
scientific truth of this frame but because they believe it is culturally indispensable that
we define addiction as a disease if it is to be met with enlightened societal responses,
sympathy rather than scorn (see Leshner, 1997). It is only thus, they often insist, that we
can argue addicts should not be blamed but helped. However, as I show, their efforts, and
those of many of their most prominent critics, to foster more humane interventions are
undermined by the aspirations to make universal and value-neutral scientific claims
about addiction. In this article, I explicitly demonstrate these difficulties among both
those in the disease camp and those in the liberal voluntarist camp who oppose them and
seek to open a path forward through an examination of two major early modern dis-
courses on addiction.
Hence, my analytic take on the second two discursive registers I consider is decidedly
different from that I bring to bear on the first two. Rather than positioning myself as
constructively critical and aligned in the project of better promoting certain values also
promoted in these discourses, I take a more historicist position. In the second two cases,
then, my effort is simply to reconstruct and understand the meaning these discourses had
for those who participated in them without any effort to assess their validity or to
improve upon them by contemporary scientific lights. Instead, the purpose of these
analyses is to demonstrate to readers how contemporary addiction science can better
fulfil the objectives of therapeutic relevance and providing credible warrant for therapy
over punishment through the selective adoption and modification of certain elements of
these earlier discourses.
One reviewer of an earlier draft of this article usefully noted that neither determinist
nor voluntarist addiction science is homogeneous and that one can, in fact, locate
researchers on a continuum between determinism and voluntarism. More specifically,
s/he proposed I stress that the following analysis makes use of Weberian ideal types to
excavate and analyse how freedom and addiction are variously conceptualized in addic-
tion science. In an important sense s/he is entirely correct, insofar as I do focus attention
not on highlighting the diversity of positions found in addiction science but on particular
major tendencies. However, as I reacquainted myself with the literature on ideal types
and, in particular, the eminent Weber scholar Richard Swedberg’s (2018) recent illumi-
nating commentary, I became convinced that my own theoretical and methodological
approach diverges from Weber’s. For Weber, ideal types are artificial constructs, indeed
fictions, with which social reality is compared. My own approach is instead to factually
identify important theoretical tendencies in the addiction science literature and their
ramifications with respect to our understanding of freedom and addiction. To reiterate,
this study emphatically does not exhaustively catalogue or comprehensively assess the
neurological or social scientific literatures on addiction but is only a selective analysis of
certain central and important trends.
It should also be emphasized that this analysis is focused only on demonstrating and
overcoming some significant limitations that follow from the widespread efforts in both
the brain disease and choice theoretic literatures to produce theories about addiction that
are both universal and value-free. I do not think it can be credibly denied that such
research is indeed pervasive in addiction science. But this also means that to the extent
Weinberg 3
contemporary research does not aspire to universality or value-neutrality, it is not a
central focus of my analysis. Pertinent to this point, another reviewer of an earlier
draft of this article recommended a more thorough engagement with current anthro-
pological research on addiction. It is certainly correct to note a long and fruitful
tradition of anthropological research related to drug and alcohol use and an important
flowering of ethnographic research on addiction in anthropology and allied disciplines
over the last 15 years or so (see Bourgois and Schonberg, 2009; Carr, 2011; Dennis,
2019; Dilkes-Frayne et al., 2017; Duff, 2008; Fraser and Moore, 2011; Garcia, 2010;
Gowan and Whetstone, 2012; Raikhel, 2016; Raikhel and Garriott, 2013; Schull,
2012; Weinberg, 2005; Zigon, 2011). This literature has vastly enriched our acquain-
tance with the phenomenological nuances of drug use, addiction, and the extent to
which these are inextricably entwined with broader economic, political, and cultural
realities.
However, it only very indirectly addresses the concerns I am raising here. That is, the
limits placed on our ability in both the brain disease and liberal voluntarist literatures to
produce therapeutically relevant findings or warrants for therapeutic care by the wide-
spread scientific aspirations to produce universally valid and value-neutral theories of
addiction. In fact, much of the classic ethnographic literature on drug use is both con-
sistent with and uncritical of the universalistic and value-neutral aspirations of the liberal
voluntarist discourse. This literature is largely devoted to describing the locally adopted
cultural norms and practices within which unproblematic drinking and drug use occur
rather than the sometimes seemingly self-destructive addictive aspects of their use (see
Douglas, 1987; Heath, 2012; Room, 1984; Singer, 2012). While these practices are
culturally diverse, there is little if any suggestion that they are unfree. And most ethno-
graphic work specifically focused on addiction itself tends to foreground the important
roles played by language and social structural deprivation. For example, many ethno-
graphies suggest that addiction discourse be understood as what C. Wright Mills (1940)
famously called ‘vocabularies of motive’ furnished by, for example, addiction treatment
clinics (Carr, 2011; Davies, 1992; Garcia, 2010; Weinberg, 2000), or that putative
addictions are often practical adaptations to the hardships of social structural deprivation
and oppression (Bourgois and Schonberg, 2009; Garcia, 2010; Waterston, 1993; Wein-
berg, 2005). These studies vividly highlight the structurally and culturally specific
conditions under which people make their decisions concerning drug use, addiction, and
recovery but rarely, if ever, explicitly consider the question of whether and how addic-
tion reflects a loss of self-control.
These kinds of analysis incisively and, I would argue, crucially identify various
elements of social context as integral to the production and reproduction of both addic-
tions and discourses thereof. However, close inspection reveals they are much less
explicit about how we might warrant or inform therapeutic or exculpatory orientations
to addictions. No doubt, it is correct to insist that social structural dynamics powerfully
encourage both putative addicts and others to construe their problems in personal, rather
than social structural, terms and to thereby misrecognize the various ways in which those
problems are caused by macro-structural regimes like economic exploitation, racism,
sexism, or homophobia (see Bourgois and Schonberg, 2009; Gowan and Whetstone,
2012; Weinberg, 2005). But while these insights valuably encourage more attention to
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how addictions can be remedied through social structural interventions, it is less obvious
how they mitigate putative addicts’ ethical accountability for their specific responses to
the deprivations and oppressions they suffer. Some years ago, Erving Goffman (1961:
86–7; original emphasis) relevantly observed,
Although there is . . . an environmental view of crime and counter-revolutionary activity,
both freeing the offender from moral responsibility for his [sic] offence, total institutions
can little afford this particular kind of determinism. Inmates must be caused to self-direct
themselves in a manageable way, and, for this to be promoted, both desired and undesired
conduct must be defined . . . as something [they] can do something about.
Goffman’s observation in this regard holds not only for what he called ‘total insti-
tutions’ devoted to the management of addictions but, indeed, wherever people wish
to promote a specifically therapeutic orientation, in contrast to neurological or
critical sociological orientations, to addiction—that is, to promote the emancipation
of particular people from their own putative addictions rather than address addic-
tion’s general aetiological causes in neurological processes, vocabularies of motive,
or social oppression. However, in stark contrast to a criminalizing frame, a thera-
peutic frame requires that we interpret putative addicts not as culpable but as
afflicted and therefore in need of care. Hence, warranting and implementing a
therapeutic frame for addiction does not in the first instance require theories that
serve only to explain the general causes of putatively addicted behaviour; it specif-
ically requires theories that allow these behaviours to be, at least partially, ethically
disowned. It is only by distinguishing the free agency of addicts’ particular selves,
their self-control, from the causal effects of their specific addictions that people
might be simultaneously understood as amenable to therapeutic empowerment or
emancipation from their addictions through recovery and somehow also as afflicted
by an addiction that justifies and demands such a therapeutic engagement in the first
place (Weinberg, 2000).
My argument is that these specifically ethical and experiential aspects of addiction
and recovery have been clouded by the universalist and value-neutral tendencies
observable in much of the scientific literature on addiction. These tendencies manifest,
on the one hand, in neurologically and social structurally deterministic explanations
that tend, as Goffman observed, to gloss the complex forms of discretion and ethical
accountability that practically arise in our everyday lives and, on the other hand, in
liberal voluntarist discourses of ‘choice’ that tend to gloss the complex ways in which
our discretion, and hence our individual rights and responsibilities, are often practi-
cally diminished or mitigated in our everyday lives, sometimes encouraging an ethic
of care over a liberal ethic of individual rights and responsibilities (see Nussbaum,
2006).1 As I have noted, universalism and value-neutrality foster a tendency toward
scientific and ethical detachment that is inconsistent with a therapeutic and/or ethical
engagement with putative addicts’ particular lived experiences. As a result, they fetter
our capacities to inform or warrant the provision of therapeutic care over punishment.
It is in the interest of identifying and beginning to overcome these fetters that this
article has been written.
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The brain disease discourse
In a widely cited article in the Annual Review of Neuroscience, the distinguished neu-
rologist Steven Hyman and his colleagues wrote,
Unlike natural rewards, addictive drugs do not serve any beneficial homeostatic or repro-
ductive purpose but instead often prove detrimental to health and functioning. Much work
over several decades has begun to paint a picture of how addictive drugs come to masquer-
ade as, and eventually supplant, natural rewards as highly valued goals. (Hyman, Malenka,
and Nestler, 2006: 571)2
We see here, cast in the presumptively value-neutral register of neurology, an explicit
contrast of natural rewards, as experiences whose value is biologically determined to
foster behaviour conducive to health and reproduction, with the presumptively unna-
tural, and health-threatening (or at least health-irrelevant), rewards of drug use. This
distinction lies at the heart of the now ascendant scientific model of addiction, what
historian David Courtwright (2010) has dubbed the NIDA (National Institute on Drug
Abuse) brain disease paradigm. It is precisely by way of this distinction that a
scientific case is made for the argument that addictive drugs deprive addicts of their
freedom, and precisely thereby create a medical disability warranting medical care
(Kalivas and Volkow, 2005; Kelley and Berridge, 2002; Robinson and Berridge,
2003). By unnaturally ‘hijacking’ the brain’s natural proclivities to reward healthy
behaviour, addictive drugs deceive, usurp, and enslave the brain’s reward circuitry,
causing a ‘loss of self control’ and rendering untold harms to victims themselves and
to their societies (Volkow, Koob, and McLellan, 2016: 364). Ironically, there is
implicit in this wholly deterministic account of the human brain and its biomechanical
responses to addictive chemicals a distinct (if dubious) theory of human freedom. If
addiction, or the loss of self-control, flows from our sustained indulgence in, and
pathological valuing of, the unnatural rewards of drug use, then our freedom, or the
retention of our self-control, must, by implication, consist largely in confining our
attention to the value of natural, or biologically healthy, rewards.
The NIDA brain disease paradigm is undoubtedly hegemonic in contemporary addic-
tion science, but it is by no means uncontested. Critics point to the challenges of
reconciling the NIDA paradigm with the epidemiological facts that only a small fraction
of those who have used addictive drugs fall into detrimental patterns of use (SAMHSA
Office of Applied Studies, 2008); that many who do fall into these patterns ‘mature out’
of them without treatment (Robins, 1993; Winick, 1962); and that it is often social rather
than genetic or neurological disadvantages that best predict who is most likely to suc-
cumb to addictive drug use and who is least likely to recover from it (Alexander, 2008;
Edwards, 2005; Waldorf, Reinarman, and Murphy, 1991). As awkward as these epide-
miological facts certainly are for defenders of the brain disease paradigm, a still more
fundamental difficulty attends their conspicuous reticence to explicitly develop their
implicit orientations to freedom—that is, their views of exactly what addicts actually
lose when they lose their self-control. However, we can begin to flesh out these views by
attending to their counterparts: ascendant neurological theories of addiction itself. How
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do proponents of the brain disease paradigm provide for the putative loss of our freedom
to addiction?
They do so in primarily two ways. First, incentive sensitization theorists argue that
through sustained exposure addicts’ desire (want) for drugs is neurologically disjoined
from the degree to which they find pleasure in (like) drug use (Robinson and Berridge,
2003). Hence, their desire for drugs is not only ‘unnatural’ but eventually unjustified by
the pleasure users believe they derive from them. This allows brain disease scientists to
cast this desire as both pathological and involuntary because it is both unhealthy and
inconsistent with orthodox postulates of rational choice. But the equation of freedom
with either health maintenance or a generic model of rationality is not scientifically
sustainable. In modern liberal societies, not all unhealthy conduct, irrationality, nor even
misplaced desire is considered unfree, let alone pathological. In practice, people freely
value a wide range of both healthy and unhealthy preferences under widely divergent
conditions of (mis)understanding. Beyond valorizing health and rational choice, addic-
tion scientists must tell us how people actually grow estranged from their behaviour
enough to warrant the claim that their self-control is genuinely afflicted, and, hence, their
freedom attenuated, by addiction. Findings that sometimes people want things more than
they like them is not sufficient warrant for such a claim.
The second way addictions are normally said to deprive people of their freedom is by
compromising brain processes associated with ‘executive functions’ (Kalivas and
O’Brien, 2008). These functions are not always clearly specified in the brain disease
literature, but they include things like attention, response inhibition, planning, problem-
solving, and working memory. Like research on incentive sensitization, this research
also seeks universal and value-neutral neurological measures of freedom and addiction.
But the argument that people universally equate their own or one another’s freedom with
long-term planning, problem-solving, and impulse control is undeniably false. Not only
do we freely throw caution to the wind on occasion, but so too on occasion do we equate
our most authentic values with our gut instincts, spontaneous desires, and other emo-
tional impulses and, indeed, equate the kinds of cognitive processes associated with
executive function with alienation from our real selves, freedom, and authentic self-
control (Alasuutari, 1992; Hochschild, 2012; Turner, 1976). On these accounts, our
freedom is undermined rather than facilitated by the inhibitions imposed by executive
functions. Indeed, a vivid and pertinent illustration of this is the extensive therapeutic
emphasis drug rehabilitation programmes like Alcoholics Anonymous themselves place
not on the executive repression of spontaneous emotions but on encouraging their free
and open expression in the interest of facilitating people’s better self-understanding and
self-control (Carr, 2011; Garriott and Raikhel, 2015; Valverde, 1998; Weinberg, 2013;
Zigon, 2011).
The brain disease literature’s tendency to disregard the manifest diversity of empirical
forms taken by freedom and addiction, self-control and its loss, stems from an evident
inability or unwillingness to breach the boundaries of brain biology in any but the most
cursory manner (Campbell, 2010; Vrecko, 2010). While brain disease theorists allow
that Pavlovian conditioning may arbitrarily link environmental cues with the unnatural
rewards neurologically intrinsic to addictive substances and activities, these are entirely
ancillary to the neurological reward circuitry by which our ultimate value preferences are
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determined. In this way, both freedom (implicitly defined as a rational value preference
for rewards conducive to biological health) and addiction (implicitly defined as an
irrational value preference for rewards that may threaten health) are conceptualized as
fundamentally ahistorical and neurologically determined. Addiction is thus held to afflict
our personal freedom only to the extent we equate freedom with an invariant commit-
ment to value biological health above all else. While this research may very well
continue to yield scientific dividends in other ways, it will never yield an empirically
adequate grasp of the nuanced phenomenology of becoming estranged from one’s own
behaviour—that is, losing self-control—nor the jointly intrapersonal, interpersonal, and
social structural dynamics that render that estrangement so real for people. Because it
fails to adequately explain the loss of self-control to addiction, this research fails to fulfil
its ethical objective of providing scientific warrant for therapeutic care for addicts.
Insofar as it does not fulfil its promise of distinguishing addictions, specifically as
afflictions, from the free moral agency of people who suffer from these afflictions, brain
disease discourse provides no coherent warrant for medical care over blame and
punishment.
The liberal voluntarist discourse
The medicalization of addiction has always been vigorously contested (see Alexander,
2008; Fraser, Moore, and Keane, 2014; Granfeld and Reinarman, 2015; Netherland,
2012; Satel and Lilienfeld, 2013). Indeed, the idea that addicts never in fact lose their
freedom of choice remains widespread in both the social sciences and popular culture
(Valverde, 1998). Dating back at least to John Stuart Mill’s essay On Liberty
(2005[1859]), this position has been largely based on the liberal democratic value judge-
ments that all people should be viewed to possess the faculty of self-government and that
it is unjust to suppress their free exercise thereof (Foddy and Savulescu, 2010; Szasz,
2003). Perhaps ironically, these value judgements have become widely entrenched in the
social sciences via ostensibly value-neutral postures of agnosticism toward elite and/or
mainstream norms disparaging historically marginalized groups and a concomitant
emphasis of the local rationality of these groups and their own sense of moral legitimacy.
This has been part of a more general social scientific tendency to understand social
reality as invariably composed of the consensual or conflictual interactions of integrated
social groups and to define their members as integrated individuals: rational, self-
governing agents who affiliate with these groups based on their belief in the group’s
traditions, interests, or values.
Hence, more specifically, by the mid 20th century putative addicts were often
described as members of subcultures with their own distinctive value systems rather
than sufferers of intrinsic personal afflictions or deficits of any kind (Finestone, 1957;
Hughes, 2007; Preble and Casey, 1969; Stephens, 1991). Concerned to avoid slipping
from their presumed value-neutrality into an illiberally biased moralism, social research-
ers have often overlooked the fact that addiction, understood specifically as a loss of self-
control, is an idea putative addicts often themselves take seriously and is not necessarily
coercively imposed from without. In short, social scientists have very often held that
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addiction reflects a notorious but nonetheless voluntary choice to value the use of drugs
over matters that others in society consider more important (Weinberg, 2011).
Since roughly the 1980s, a growing collection of self-described ‘choice theorists’ in
sociology, economics, social psychology, philosophy, and even neuroscience itself has
sought to develop this position more methodically (see Davies, 1992; Heather and Segal,
2017; Heyman, 2009; Lewis, 2018). These theorists tend to begin with the observation
that most behaviour attributed to addictions is ‘incentive sensitive’ (consistent with cost–
benefit analysis) and not compulsive in the orthodox neurological sense emphasized by
disease theorists. While this is true, we should not make too much of it. Plants are
incentive sensitive in the sense that they grow toward resources like light and water,
but we would not normally want to conceptualize this as a voluntary choice. Defending
the liberal voluntarist understanding of addiction, the philosophers Bennett Foddy and
Julian Savulescu (2007: 31) argue that while it may be ‘hopelessly romantic’ to suggest
there are no biological correlates to human preferences, the reduction of freedom to the
pursuit of health-relevant natural rewards is untenable. Self-government is quite obvi-
ously motivated by a wide range of values, many of which put our biological health at
risk. Activities like mountaineering, refusing under torture to divulge state secrets, or
even indulging a sweet tooth may very well be highly valued and freely engaged in
despite their failure to fulfil anything neurologists would regard as naturally rewarding or
serving of a biologically ‘beneficial homeostatic or reproductive purpose’.
From these and similar observations, choice theorists conclude that it is scientifically
false (and politically illiberal) to insist preferences are freely adopted and natural when
they foster health, unfree and unnatural when they might threaten health. Preferences,
they argue, are neither natural nor unnatural. They simply reflect predispositions to avoid
or relieve experiences we as individuals devalue and pursue experiences we personally
do value. And if there is no scientifically sound way to distinguish natural from unnatural
preferences, there is no way of objectively distinguishing free from pathological motiva-
tions, and we must conclude that putative addicts voluntarily choose to act as they do.
According to this argument, the notion that addiction entails a loss of freedom is nothing
but a myth with which we improperly exonerate people for their wrongdoings or deni-
grate, dehumanize, and persecute marginalized members of our societies (Davies, 1992;
Heather and Segal, 2017; Heyman, 2009; Lewis, 2018; Szasz, 2003). This argument not
only flatly denies the validity of current scientific claims distinguishing addiction from
freedom but, according to authors like Foddy and Savulescu (2010), requires that any
future scientific claims in this regard must be conceptualized independently of not only
neurological conceptions of natural and unnatural rewards, but any substantive claims at
all regarding the health or objective value of people’s preferences. Citing the 19th-
century diagnosis of ‘drapetomania’, or the pathological propensity of slaves to run
away, they write,
In the American South during the mid-nineteenth century, it may have been difficult to
believe that a sane slave would wish to escape captivity. Today, it is difficult to believe that
a sane person would wish for outcomes that are harmful to their health, simply because
normal people prioritize health ahead of pleasure. The case of drapetomania explains why
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no version of the claim that addiction is a disease should contain substantive normative
claims about what a person’s preferences should be. (Foddy and Savulscu, 2010: 9)
Because we can find historical examples of disease categories like drapetomania that
were based on now discredited claims regarding normatively appropriate behaviour, we
must confine the use of the concept disease to value-free and asocial accounts of bio-
logical dysfunction. While on first blush this appears plausible, there are in fact
immense, and probably insurmountable, challenges to defining even physical diseases
in ways that altogether avoid normative presumptions of a dispreferred state of affairs
(Metzl and Kirkland, 2010). This problem is particularly acute in addiction science, and
indeed mental health research more generally, wherein we must contend with a much
higher level of dissensus about the natural functions and/or dysfunctions of mental
structures or processes (Bolton, 2010; Fulford, 1989). The clinical validity of even
uncontroversial psychiatric diagnoses like OCD or schizophrenia is invariably predi-
cated not on generic scientific findings of biological or psychological dysfunction but
highly contingent value judgements of personal or social dysfunction furnished by
patients and their significant others—that is, friends, family members, colleagues, and
others with personal knowledge of the patient’s unique biography and social
circumstances.
On its face, one would not think this should be a problem for liberal theory. After all,
since its inception, liberalism has been vigorously opposed to the idea that people’s
values should be dictated by any singular authority, be it a king, divine will, biology,
or nature more generally. It has insisted instead upon a pluralistic moral universe
wherein we decide for ourselves what it means to be free or to pursue our own concep-
tions of the good life without interference. One might reasonably expect, then, that
liberal theory would also hold each of us entitled to decide if and when our freedom
had been diminished and by what. But, sadly, what was once a pluralist and egalitarian
ethic of moral and epistemological tolerance has for many become a presumptive social
ontology wherein human behaviour is axiomatically understood as always free—that is,
unless physically compromised—and invariably expressive of the values of its author.
A prominent defender of this view, the sociologist Anthony Giddens, has insisted that
someone threatened with death for defiance is still making a free choice to do as s/he is
told predicated on a personal value judgement that living is better than dying. By these
lights, only physical forces can literally determine our actions rather than merely incen-
tivizing us, through appeals to our personal values, to freely adopt them (Giddens and
Pierson, 1998: 84). As the writings of Thomas Szasz, and other neoliberals, amply
demonstrate, this ontology affords no room for mental disease at all. The price of its
adoption is thus a dogmatic refusal to recognize any form of mental affliction that is not
demonstrably linked to biological dysfunction. Because the neuro-adaptations identified
by brain disease theorists are not invariably dysfunctional (they result from prolonged
exposure to all sources of reward), they cannot support the claim that addiction is a
disease or anything other than an expression of strong, but nonetheless freely pursued,
appetites (see Lewis, 2018).
Hence, like many contributors to the brain disease discourse, many contributors to the
liberal voluntarist discourse on addiction tend to define freedom and addiction in
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universal and value-neutral terms. They do so not by conceptualizing freedom and
addiction biologically. Instead, freedom is conceptualized a priori as an axiomatic
resource with which to explain history but which is itself an historical constant—a
universal feature of human behaviour that neither varies historically nor is ever attenu-
ated by anything other than physical constraints. While this social ontology may con-
tinue to yield other theoretical dividends, it, like the brain disease paradigm, cannot
adequately describe nor explain the nuanced phenomenology of becoming estranged
from one’s own behaviour-that is, losing self-control. And, hence, to the extent they
aspire to universality and value-neutrality, defenders of the liberal voluntarist discourse
have also provided no coherent warrant for therapeutic care as opposed to blaming
addicts for their fates.
The early modern Puritan discourse
Taking issue with Harry Gene Levine’s (1978) landmark analysis of the discovery of
addiction, historian Jessica Warner (1994: 685) argued the earliest exponents of the
disease theory were Puritan clergyman, not physicians:
It is in the religious oratory of Stuart England that we find the key components of the idea
that habitual drunkenness constitutes a progressive disease, the chief symptom of which is a
loss of control over drinking behavior. By the same token, the modern conception of
addiction was not, as Levine claimed, first formulated in the medical community but had
previously been fulminated from the pulpit.
Warner did not take issue with Levine’s distinction between addiction as sin and as
sickness—moral and medical orientations to addiction—but sought, instead, to insist that
Levine’s crediting of physicians with originating the medical concept was mistaken.
This is a somewhat puzzling claim. In opposition to Roy Porter (1985: 390), who advised
efforts to ‘understand the making of the idea of alcoholism within its socio-intellectual
milieu, in particular in regard to changing conceptions of disease’, Warner (1994: 686)
argued, ‘The noun “disease” appears to have had a fairly constant meaning over the past
several centuries’. That this argument is factually incorrect will be demonstrated later.
For now, let us confine our attention to its implications for her general thesis. If religious
orators in Stuart England understood the concept of disease as orthodox biomedicine
does today—as a biomechanical failure of the body, involuntary and therefore morally
exempt—how did they reconcile this understanding with the traditional religious view
that habitual drunkenness was a sin?
Levine (1978: 150–1) also noted cases of pre-industrial clerics describing habitual
drunkenness as a kind of ‘madness’ and an ‘incurable’ habit but argued their Calvinist
theology ultimately blocked them from accepting the idea that some forms of drinking
were genuinely beyond the drinker’s control:
Puritan ministers were the most troubled by habitual drunkenness, and in some scattered
phrases and sentences we find evidence of their trying to stretch beyond the ideas of their
days. Increase Mather, for example, declared that habitual drunkenness was a kind of
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madness, and Foxcroft warned moderate drinkers that they were ‘in danger of contracting an
incurable Habit’. But the ministers were not able to synthesize their observations; they were
bound by the categories of their theology and psychology . . . for Puritans. . . . The individual
was always viewed as having the freedom to choose to sin or not.
Though for different reasons, Levine’s argument here is also puzzling. Given their well-
known doctrinal rigidity, what motivated Puritan ministers to ‘stretch beyond the ideas
of their days’? How could Increase Mather have reconciled describing habitual drunken-
ness as a kind of madness with an insistence that it was nonetheless a sinful exercise of
free will? Pace Levine, Warner’s first attempt to solve these puzzles was to place staunch
faith in the self-evidence of experience. Puritan ministers, she argued, were not bound by
their theology to interpret people’s behaviour as freely chosen. Their sermons were
instead directly influenced by first-hand observations. After citing some instances of
preachers discussing habitual drunkenness as a loss of self-control, she wrote,
It would be wrong to place undue emphasis on the examples just given, or to assume that the
notion of addiction was central to earlier definitions of habitual drunkenness. But it would
be equally wrong to assume that earlier generations were inherently incapable of describing
destructive behavior in an empirical or critical fashion, or to assume that the mind-set of
preindustrial society somehow blinded contemporaries to the addicts in their midst. (War-
ner, 1994: 688)
In this passage, Warner seems to have been insisting the difference between addicts and
voluntary drunkards was empirically obvious and beyond debate. The Puritan clergy’s
theological conviction that sinful behaviour invariably hailed from sinful free choices
was, then, simply overwhelmed by the brute force of empirical observation. The degree
of controversy that even now surrounds the very existence of addiction, let alone the
diagnoses of particular cases, casts Warner’s seemingly naı̈ve empiricism in consider-
able doubt (Alexander, 2008; Reinarman, 2005; Reith, 2019). As we have seen,
contemporary liberal theory provides robust evidence that those who choose to interpret
self-destructive drinking as freely chosen behaviour are quite capable of construing the
empirical evidence accordingly. Hence, Warner’s claim that Puritan ministers’ commit-
ment to the doctrine of free will was decisively trumped by empirical evidence alone
cannot be taken seriously. Later in her article, Warner (1994: 690) proposed a second
rather more plausible argument: that preachers’ use of medical language was often just
an ad hoc rhetorical strategy designed not to lay any serious claim to medical expertise
but only to influence parishioners:
We have already seen that preachers routinely cited medical evidence when exhorting their
audiences to abandon the sin of drunkenness. It is perhaps in much the same spirit that
friends and family might today tell a chain-smoker that he or she runs a high risk of an early
death; they might say so not because they are physicians or are themselves especially
familiar with the medical evidence, but because they abhor the habit in question, and
knowingly resort to a variety of appeals and rhetorical stratagems in hopes of rectifying
an undesirable behavior.
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There is a big difference, though, between loosely invoking claims like ‘smoking kills’
that have already been medically authorized and simply making up one’s own health
claims without medical authorization. If Warner was suggesting the former, her argu-
ment regarding the historical priority of the clerics’ formulations is lost. If she was
suggesting the later, she would have needed to either explain what justified clerics’
claims to medical knowledge independent of medical authorization or accept that their
claims were not epistemologically authorized—that they were only rhetorical stratagems
rather than literal descriptions. This would then raise the question of why anyone would
have eventually taken such rhetoric sufficiently seriously to begin treating it literally, let
alone scientifically.
Though largely critical of her analysis, Peter Ferentzy (2001: 387) agreed with War-
ner that clerical invocations of disease were often just ad hoc exhortations: ‘Preachers
often used terms such as “disease” and “sickness” loosely, with little or no suggestion
that medical issues were involved’. No doubt, Ferentzy was correct to advise caution in
interpreting pre-industrial sermons and religious commentaries too literally. It is cer-
tainly true that many religious orators had few qualms about taking rhetorical liberties or
drawing upon metaphors in their efforts to sway their flocks. That said, the claim that
clerical uses of medical language were never literal is empirically unsustainable. Con-
sider the following passage on habitual drunkenness from the pre-eminent Puritan scho-
lar Richard Baxter’s A Christian Directory (1825[1673]: 410–11):
Had God made thee an idiot, or mad and lunatic, thy case had been to be pitied: but to make
thy self mad and despise thy manhood, deserveth punishment. It is the saying of Basil;
‘Involuntary madness deserveth compassion, but voluntary madness, the sharpest whips.’
“Judgments are prepared for scorners, and stripes for the fools back: especially for the
voluntary fool”: He that will make himself a beast or a madman, should be used by others
like a beast or a madman, whether he will or not.
In this passage, Baxter very clearly distinguished divinely imposed from self-imposed
madness to make a point regarding moral culpability. It is very hard to see how this could
have been anything other than a literal distinction. But there is a second point to be made
with respect to this passage. Baxter also very clearly treated habitual drunkenness as a
sinful madness—a madness, but one deserving of punishment. This formulation is mani-
festly at odds with the contemporary biomechanical formulation of disease as morally
exculpatory and with the choice theoretic literature that also starkly contrasts immorality
and sickness. Without impugning its contemporary ethical merits, there can be no doubt
that the now scientifically entrenched categorical dichotomy between immorality and
sickness is inconsistent with much of the historical record of how early modern Eur-
opeans oriented to habitual drunkenness (Baumohl and Room, 1987; Nicholls, 2009;
Valverde, 1998). It also leaves anomalous the fact that religious writers historically
preceded physicians in literally asserting that habitual drunkenness was often an enslav-
ing disease. This anomaly can be resolved by recalling the relationship people of the
period routinely drew between religion and health.
During the 17th and 18th centuries, most Protestants understood all diseases as
products of humanity’s fall from grace and, in the case of particular communities or
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individuals, God’s punishment of sin (Starr, 1982; Thomas, 1971).3 By the 18th century,
it was a cultural commonplace that temperate eating and drinking habits, sex lives, and
lifestyles more generally were healthy because virtuous and, to some extent, virtuous
because healthy.4 The Enlightenment certainly fostered more optimism about the pos-
sibility of proactively overcoming human ills, but this did not supplant so much as
transform the putative role of God in creating, and religious virtue in stemming, those
ills. God was now understood to reward virtue and punish vice less through the myster-
ious dictates of His divine discretion than through the divinely authored medium of
nature, the laws of which could be discerned and honoured through use of His greatest
gift to humanity: our reason. People retained their health by use of this divine gift to
better understand and more strictly obey the dictates of God’s natural design.
That this fusion of religious and medical thought served as a common-sense backcloth
to the work of both ministers and physicians in the 17th and 18th centuries must not be
forgotten as we seek to interpret their writings. Against this backcloth we can see that
pre-industrial Puritan preachers likely felt little need to explicitly justify the then patently
obvious claim that many diseases were in fact the wages of sin—particularly those that
resulted from a manifest disregard for God’s law. This fact of life was not, as Warner
might claim, empirically self-evident and immune to culturally informed presupposi-
tions. It was instead itself a well-established cultural inheritance widely shared by 17th-
and 18th-century Protestants. For those ensconced in this common culture, symptoms of
culpable diseases may not themselves have exhibited ‘choices’, the free will of the
afflicted, but they nonetheless quite certainly bore the stigma of sin and God’s disfavour.
Diseases like leprosy and the pox were widely thought to follow from sinful sexual
behaviour, dropsy and madness from gluttony, and so on (Thomas, 1971). For many
early modern Protestants, these were very real diseases, but diseases that invited con-
tempt rather than sympathy. They were diseases that marked one as an unregenerate
sinner, damned and deserving not of care but all the brutality one could anticipate from
hell. As Richard Baxter advised, ‘Involuntary madness deserveth compassion, but vol-
untary madness, the sharpest whips’. Hence, the questions that have hitherto framed
much of the debate on the medicalization of addiction—when, where, and how was
addiction transformed from a sin into a sickness?—do not fully square with the historical
record. We should instead be asking when, where, and how the sinful sickness of habitual
drunkenness became a cause for compassion rather than contempt. What changed was
not the status of habitual drunkenness as a sinful sickness but the status of those per-
ceived to be afflicted, from damned and despised to reformable and deserving of support.
Before the middle of the 18th century, habitual drunkards were often described as
pathologically enslaved to drink or drunkenness (Nicholls, 2009; Porter, 1985; Warner,
1994). What was largely missing was any expression of empathy for those so enslaved or
any faith that they could or should be freed from their madness.
The early modern civic republican discourse
The early modern Puritan discourse on freedom and addiction was predicated on the
doctrine of predestination, a doctrine that strictly opposed the idea that our eternal fate
was a reward for virtue or punishment of vice. Vicious and virtuous conduct were not
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held to issue from a provisional character capable of moral corruption or elevation but
instead a fixed and eternal character either damned or saved from the outset. Freedom, as
opposed to the slavery of habitual drunkenness, was understood as the conduct of one’s
life in accordance with the dictates of a morally ordered universe. It reflected one’s status
among the elect and the happy harmony of one’s own rational judgement with God’s
will. Conversely, the sin of habitual drunkenness was understood as a form of slavery to
Satan rather than, as liberal theorists would have it today, an independently chosen moral
transgression.5 One was punished as a minion of Satan rather than, as now, an autono-
mous and reformable wrongdoer. It was within this discursive frame that the logic of
brutally forsaking those enslaved by alcohol made moral sense.
The early modern rise of civic republicanism rather dramatically reoriented think-
ing on these matters (Nicholls, 2009; Schmidt, 1995). In contrast to Puritan thought,
this orientation to freedom was predicated not upon abstract scholastic dialogue
regarding the fixed characteristics of the immaterial human soul and its worldly tri-
bulations, but upon mundane practical dialogue through which was fluidly shaped
one’s eminently cultivated and worldly personal character. Civic republican concep-
tions of freedom and slavery can be traced back to ancient Greek and Roman political
thought, but, via the Italian renaissance, they enjoyed a notable comeback in 17th-
century England (Pocock, 1975). For civic republicans, freedom consisted in our use of
reason both to tame our unruly and selfish passions and to develop and implement an
educated understanding of the public good. This was in its orthodox form a plainly
aristocratic ethos whereby men of excellence exhibited their distinction through wise
and honourable public service.
However, its revival in early modern England reflected a much more dynamic public
culture contested by royal, aristocratic, religious, and commercial actors, among others
(Withington, 2007). This social structural context had the effect of shifting early modern
orientations to reason and freedom from state-centric aristocratic virtues like courage
and honour in the direction of more civic virtues like mundane sensibility, tact, and
diplomacy (Knott, 2009; Wood, 1998: x). Slavery consisted in one’s capacity to realize
these virtues being denied through unreasoned servitude (Pocock, 1975: 229). Crucially
for present purposes, the capacity to develop these virtues could be denied not only by
the tyranny of others but also by the tyranny of our own passions and desires. By civic
republican lights, slavery to habitual drunkenness was less an exhibit of one’s fixed
status among the damned than a profligate but acquired propensity to debase one’s
character—an unchecked desire for excessive (and therefore ‘unnatural’) bodily enjoy-
ment eclipsing one’s commitment to act and reason soundly for the public good. More-
over, yielding to temptation was understood not as a mark of one’s fixed status as
eternally damned but as a disabling process whereby one became progressively more
dissipated, enervated, and enslaved the more one continued to yield (Berry, 1994).
During the 18th century, one could increasingly observe invocations of civic repub-
lican themes among those concerned that the luxury and licence of the prosperous were
pervading society to an extent that threatened the nation’s survival (Reith, 2019). For
example, in his highly influential tract, An Enquiry Into the Causes of the Late Increase
in Robbers, Henry Fielding (1751: 6) wrote,
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First then, I think, that the vast Torrent of Luxury which of late Years hath poured itself into
this Nation, hath greatly contributed to produce, among many others, the Mischief I here
complain of. I am not here to satirize the Great, among whom Luxury is probably rather a
moral than a political Evil. But Vices no more than Diseases will stop with them; for bad
Habits are as infectious by Example, as the Plague itself by Contact. In free Countries, at
least, it is a Branch of Liberty claimed by the People to be as wicked and as profligate as
their Superiors.
Though his primary concern was the corrupting effects of the spread of luxury and
licence to the lower orders of society, Fielding made plain his view that these effects
were evident throughout all the strata of English society and that they hailed in the first
instance from the highest strata (ibid.). This spread of profligacy was exacerbated by the
growth in trade and the material prosperity that came with it (ibid.: xxiv). Wealth was
distracting the English people from virtue and thereby from both true freedom and good
health. As Fielding’s writing illustrates, civic republican arguments provided a timely
opportunity for Protestant reformers and others to join forces in opposition to both the
lusty indulgences of the crown and court and those of the increasingly ubiquitous men of
commerce. It was they who were to blame for enticing the morally and intellectually
vulnerable working classes into extravagant and unnatural habits that, while immoral
among the better sort, were positively ruinous for the poor, particularly poor women and
children. This trend was enervating and enslaving not only individuals but the nation as a
whole by making the ‘useful’ ranks of the population morally, intellectually, and phy-
sically unfit. Few of the corrupting effects of luxury received more attention than the
abuse of distilled spirits.
By the time Benjamin Rush and Thomas Trotter, widely regarded as the fathers of
addiction medicine, lent their authority to the notion that habitual drunkenness was a
genuine disease, the general contours of their arguments had become all but common-
place among civic republican patriots (Nicholls, 2009). These arguments were dedi-
cated to stemming the rot of royal and aristocratic indulgence and caprice, the amoral
and licentious pursuit of profit through trade, and the growing depravity and disorder
they observed in the increasingly overflowing and overwhelmed urban centres. Trans-
lating republican concerns for the vicious temptations of luxury and licence into the
quasi-medical language of nervous overstimulation and natural and unnatural passions,
the arguments of Rush and Trotter reiterated broader anxieties regarding the political,
social, moral, and medical dangers of overindulgence and, in particular, the growing
temptations in this regard introduced by growing wealth, modern civilization, and
urban life (Porter, 1992). And also like their civic republican compatriots, Rush and
Trotter located the cure for addiction in the embrace of temperance, personal bonds,
modest living, and the refuge of the agrarian countryside. Freedom from addiction,
then, both could and should be fostered through the moderation of nervous stimulation
and the suppression of desires to satiate the unnatural passions provoked and unleashed
by the dazzle of urban life.
While thinkers like Trotter and Rush were plainly concerned about the dark side of
their growing consumer societies and the proliferating and increasingly potent tempta-
tions to which people were ever more routinely exposed, they were not wholly critical or
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pessimistic regarding modernization. Rush, in particular, was in much of his writing
quite hopeful that post-revolutionary America would become a bastion of republican
egalitarianism from which the rest of the world might draw inspiration. Unprecedented
religious and political freedoms would enrich and empower the United States while also
rendering them havens of Christian and republican virtue (D’Elia, 1974). While some
people might require tutelage and encouragement to meet their civic republican obliga-
tions, he did not for a moment see this as incompatible with the flourishing of religious,
political, and cultural freedoms he believed were the hallmarks of his young nation. For
Rush, the promotion of republican virtues was entirely compatible with free inquiry,
candour, and a robust tolerance of difference and dissent. Pace predestinarian Puritans,
then, he believed recovery from addiction was eminently achievable through temper-
ance. And temperance was emphatically not a matter of slavish devotion to received
medical, moral, or political doctrine but of inclusive, sociable, and self-critical dialogue
and debate.
Concluding remarks
In early modern Puritan distinctions between living in conformity and living in opposi-
tion to the divine dictates of nature and civic republican distinctions between natural and
unnatural passions, one can rather easily discern genealogical precursors to the distinc-
tion NIDA brain disease boosters now draw between natural and unnatural rewards.
However, unlike today’s neurologists, early modern commentators had the discursive
advantage of grounding their distinctions in a Lockean natural universe as yet still
saturated in largely Protestant moral meaning, a natural universe putatively designed
providentially with direct respect to humanity’s moral freedom, to encourage virtue and
good health and to discourage vice and physical enervation. Pressed by contemporary
scientific standards to conceive of human nature in universal and value-neutral terms as a
wholly biomechanical product of natural selection, brain disease theorists are now left
largely bereft of conceptual resources with which to link their biologically deterministic
accounts of health and illness to the vicissitudes of virtue and freedom. As we have seen,
the effective conflation of freedom with the narrow pursuit of health and reproduction
through natural rewards simply does not hold up against the more liberal conceptions of
freedom that have come to dominate our contemporary scientific and popular cultural
imaginations.
Conversely, though, the presumptively universal and value-neutral liberal ontology of
freedom one finds in much addiction science leaves us largely bereft of conceptual
resources with which to account for the experiences of attenuated freedom, alienation
from our thoughts, feelings, and behaviour, or any manner of genuine mental affliction
(and, hence, any convincing intellectual warrant for compassion rather than contempt for
putative addicts). Instead, it is widely held as axiomatic that all preferences exhibited by
a particular person are also the preferences of that person’s self.6 However, as an
empirical matter, we must acknowledge that people do occasionally exhibit behaviour
radically inconsistent with the ordinary proclivities they and others normally find char-
acteristic of their particular selves, and that such inconsistencies often serve in both
clinical settings and everyday life as empirical grounds for relinquishing the faith that
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they have freely or deliberately chosen to so behave and, indeed, as warrants for ther-
apeutic care (Weinberg, 2005).
A review of the early modern discursive registers considered above highlights first of
all that when it comes to understanding the relationship between freedom and addiction,
history does in fact furnish alternatives to the now widely reified antinomy between
ontological liberalism and biological determinism. Indeed, I would argue the more fluid
and dynamic dichotomy between freedom and slavery that preoccupied early modern
thinkers is a far more apt one for understanding addiction than is the much more rigid
contemporary dichotomy between freedom and biological determinism. Secondly, a
consideration of these discursive registers also highlights the considerable intersection
that was once taken for granted between judgements of freedom and judgements of
virtue and vice. Whereas we now tend to see virtuous and vicious conduct as equally
free, early modern thinkers were much more inclined to see vicious conduct to exhibit
some manner of slavery to either Satan, one’s baser passions, or both. Perhaps our
understanding of the contemporary lived experience of addiction and its relation to
freedom would be well served by a reconsideration of the extent to which addicts
and/or their significant others might be somehow similarly predisposed and, indeed,
what if any revisions to the liberal regard for freedom and addiction this might suggest.
As is well known, modern liberalism owes much to the legacy of the Scottish Enlight-
enment. In the 18th century, Francis Hutcheson insisted humans were endowed with a moral
sense that provided for our learning from, and correcting, our moral errors. David Hume
added that it was through the experience of pain in the face of vice and pleasure in the face of
virtue that this moral sense was psychologically realized. By way of Adam Smith and, later,
utilitarians like Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill, this naturalized and sentimentalized
conception of good and evil was fused with a broader conception of personal preference and
transformed into a general conception of human rationality predicated on the pursuit of
happiness (Levine, 1995). Confluent as it was with socio-historical trends toward religious
and ethical pluralism, parliamentary democracy, and free-market capitalism, the utilitarian
conception of the self as autonomous happiness maximizer has become far and away the
most influential of the modern era and remains fundamental to the liberal creed.
But by these lights there can be no distinction between what we desire and what we
consider good because our only measure of goodness is what we desire. As we have seen,
this makes distinguishing freedom from the pursuit of what we desire axiomatically
impossible and, hence, conceptualizing the idea of enslavement to one’s desires—that
is, addiction—equally impossible. Moreover, individuals cannot be mistaken in this
regard, because for anyone to take issue with the individual’s desires is, by definition,
an act of oppressive interference with their free and autonomous pursuit of happiness.
But this rigid orthodoxy of extreme moral agnosticism is plainly inconsistent with how
people, as an empirical matter, normally orient to their own and one another’s conduct in
their everyday lives. In practice, we routinely evaluate whether our own and one
another’s desires are or are not good for us or for those around us. And these moral
evaluations are contingent upon a vast range of contextual considerations (Weinberg,
2005; Zigon, 2011). Hence, if we are to reconcile liberal theory to the manifest empirical
contingency of judgements concerning freedom and addiction, it will be immensely
helpful, drawing our cues from early modern thought, to distinguish between
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contemporary liberal theory’s preponderantly hedonic orientation to personal values and
what Aristotle called eudaimonic values.7
Unlike hedonic values, eudaimonic values are not constituted by individual desires
alone. Indeed, they are values that may very well clash with our desires, and with which
our behaviour may, even chronically, fail to conform. This allows for a liberal, or
individualized and multicultural, appreciation for the broad range of values that may
orient free and autonomous behaviour without thereby assuming these values are invari-
ably hedonic. It thereby creates a possibility for conceptualizing disjuncture and tension
between our desires and our free agency and, hence, addiction, without capitulating to
the fraught conceptual antinomy between freedom and biological determinism. Liberal
critics of the brain disease paradigm are no doubt correct to note the empirically unten-
able narrowness of the neurological equation of freedom with the rational pursuit of
natural rewards. But, contrary to these liberal critics, perhaps it is more empirically
tenable, therapeutically useful, and humane to view the experience of freedom among
those who consider themselves addicts as embodied in the work they do themselves and
in collaboration with others to live more consistently in line with the eudaimonic values
they consider conducive to their personal and social flourishing rather than continuing to
adhere to the widely, if not uniformly, held liberal ontological doctrine that freedom is
only ever to be found in the pursuit of pleasure.
Returning, then, to the contemporary project of providing scientific warrant for ther-
apeutic care over blame and punishment, we might observe that sometimes, and for a
variety of biological, psychological, and social reasons, we may become sufficiently
alienated from certain of our habitual desires that we cease to experience them as
genuinely our own—but, rather, as afflictions and in some sense enslaving. Whereas
much of contemporary addiction science now assumes a more or less unified human
subject possessed of habits largely integrated through cost–benefit analysis, research in
neurology, psychology, and sociology is beginning to more fully appreciate the reality of
subjective fragmentation and disunity. For example, the distinguished neurologist of
addiction, and critic of the brain disease discourse, Marc Lewis has written in this regard
that habit-learning originates piecemeal in setting specific kinds of ways but that even-
tually, because brains tend to conserve structure and resources, habits, or acquired
‘synaptic networks’, often converge and become mutually reinforcing. However, he
notes, these processes need not converge on a wholly unified subject, or fully integrated
hub for all experience, deliberation, and volition. Instead, ‘alternative synaptic networks
can compete with each other . . . this is the case when addiction arises in development,
but also when it dissipates, replaced by the desire for and belief in alternative outcomes’
(Lewis, 2017: 182).
What Lewis does not specify, however, and what prevents him from reconciling his
incisive understanding of the neurology of addiction with his hope to produce a warrant
for therapeutic care, is the labile and dynamic relationships that occur between the
diverse constellations of habitual desire he describes as the neuroplastic synaptic net-
works to be found in our biomechanical brains, on the one hand, and, on the other hand,
our selves specifically as self-controlling, self-discovering, self-actualizing, and
ethically accountable. The fact that such selves can be—and, indeed, too often actually
are—genuinely alienated from and afflicted by deeply habituated desires perceived and
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often dreaded as traumatizing, dangerous, or, at the very least, profoundly morally
inconsistent with who they are or wish to be provides robust warrant for therapeutic
care. And it is precisely the emancipation and empowerment of these selves over their
addictions that therapeutic care for addicts often is, and ought to be, designed to foster.
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AHRC. I would like to thank Phil Withington for inviting me to participate and Phil Withington,
James Nicholls, and David Clemis for particularly helpful comments.
1. While these issues have not received much explicit attention in the ethnography of addiction as
such, they have been lucidly analysed by some in the now burgeoning anthropology of ethics—
see especially James Laidlaw’s (2015) The Subject of Virtue: An Anthropology of Ethics and
Freedom. Jarret Zigon’s (2007, 2011, 2019) work contributes to, and draws upon, this literature
in analyses of important aspects of addiction and recovery, but it does not address the central
issues raised here: the difficulties of informing and warranting therapeutic care for addicts that
arise as a consequence of aspiring to value-neutrality and universality.
2. Among other accolades, Professor Hyman is a former director of the National Institute of Mental
Health (1996–2001), editor of the Annual Review of Neuroscience, a fellow of the American
Academy of Arts and Sciences, a fellow of the American Association for the Advancement of
Science, and a Distinguished Life Fellow of the American Psychiatric Association.
3. One particularly well-known example from the late 16th century is the close association
Shakespeare drew between physical disability and moral corruption in Richard III.
4. The celebrated Georgian physician George Cheyne wrote in 1725, ‘The infinitely wise Author
of Nature has so contrived Things, that the most remarkable rules of preserving Health are
moral duties commanded us, so true it is, that Godliness has the promises of this Life, as well as
that to come’ (quoted in Rosenberg, 1992: 54, note 59). See also Benjamin Rush in 1799:
‘Christianity when believed, and obeyed . . . is more calculated to produce those effects, than
any other religion in the world. Such is the salutary operation of its doctrines, and precepts upon
health and life, that if its divine authority rested upon no other argument, this alone would be
sufficient to recommend it to our belief’ (Runes, 1947: 171).
5. It is worth underlining that in both the early modern Puritan and the civic republican discourse,
the relevant model for understanding the relationship between freedom and addiction was not
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free will versus biological determinism but free will versus slavery. Unlike biological deter-
minism, slavery can be understood as a contextually variable form of unfreedom, a matter of
degree in the sense that one can be more or less enslaved and a condition that may grow more
and less influential through time. It thus tends to preserve a degree of autonomous (if severely
attenuated) personal judgement for the afflicted actor that is not so well preserved in discus-
sions of biological determinism.
6. This formulation draws upon Rom Harre’s (1987: 42) distinction between the person (under-
stood as the ‘human being as a social individual embodied and publicly identifiable’) and the
self (understood as ‘that inner unity to which all personal experience [and, I would add,
conduct] belongs as attributes of a subject’).
7. Hedonic values concern our desires and are those that have traditionally preoccupied utilitarian
calculations concerning the rational pursuit of happiness. Eudaimonic values, on the other hand,
concern virtue as such. This contrast allows us to distinguish judgements of personal desire from
judgements of what it would mean to flourish—what, in other words, is conducive to our personal
well-being above and beyond the satisfaction of personal desires or, for that matter, above and
beyond our devotion to enshrined ethical principles (Ryan and Deci, 2001; Turner, 2018).
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